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Abstract: International trade liberalization often implies increased
potentials for export production. In order to invest in increasing
capacity in agriculture, farmers need to have credit access. However,
farmers in Central Europe and East Africa, among other places, are
credit constrained, due to collateral reasons. A model illustrates the
additional producer gains from having access to credit; the gains are
composed of a price effect, an investment effect, and a social-capital
externality. The model and empirical findings suggest that improvements of agricultural credit can be achieved by relying on existing
social structures, such as farmers’ social capital. The paper concludes
that such externalities need to be addressed when designing optimal
agricultural credit institutions.

Introduction
Agriculture is an important issue in the upcoming World
Trade Organization (WTO) round. Some of the largest economic gains arise from reducing agricultural trade barriers. To
be able to extract these gains, countries will have to overcome
a number of constraints, of which the WTO identifies capacity
problems as the most severe (Moore, 2001). Inaccessibility of
credit is often a particularly important constraint when
enhancing or restructuring agricultural supply capacity to meet
opportunities created, for example, by trade and commercialization (see, for example, Mathijs & Swinnen, 1999). In an
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African context, the problem of credit is crucial. Nevertheless,
as Mosley (1999) points out, distinction must be made between
individual credit markets, such as urban versus agricultural
credit markets, which is also the case of the Central and
Eastern European countries (CEEC) (Chloupkova, 1996).
All around the world, there are numerous cases of discrimination against low-income farmers’ credit, based on the lack
of suitable collateral, the high transaction costs of rural lending, and the various government interventions in the market. 1
Therefore, substantial demand for agricultural credit remains
unmet, particularly in the low-income segment. The objective
of this paper is thus to conceptualize the importance of agricultural credit markets in seizing the full potential of increased
access to international markets. A simple model illustrates the
theoretical effects of credit constraints. As a consequence of
the endemic lack of relevant data for econometric analysis,
regional cases from Central Europe and East Africa explain and
document the effects derived from the model.
The paper is structured as follows: first, a model used for
analyzing the importance of credit access is presented, and agricultural credit markets in the two selected regions are
described. The next section addresses the potential of trade liberalization. The section following describes the gains from
trade liberalization with and without avoiding credit constraints. The last two sections suggest a design of agricultural
credit institutions and offer some tentative conclusions.

The Model
In an ideal situation, farmers would respond to new market
opportunities by increasing supply. Since farmers often operate at the limit of their supply capacity, they must invest in
Jarka Chloupkova, a Czech citizen, is currently finishing her PhD thesis at the Royal
Veterinary and Agricultural University (KVL) in Copenhagen. Email: jarka@kvl.dk
Christian Bjørnskov, a Danish citizen, is currently a PhD student at the The Aarhus
School of Business in Aaruhs, Denmark. Email: chbj@asb.dk

18

Volume 4 Number 1

Counting Social Capital

order to seize these opportunities. The prerequisite for such
investments is the availability of financial capital from retained
farm-earnings or from having access to various sources of
credit. Yet low-income farmers are often unable to retain earnings, either because there are no saving facilities or because
earnings are not sufficiently high; thus they have to rely on
obtaining credit. However, farmers all over the world often
face credit constraints and are therefore unable to seize new
opportunities, and may even struggle to maintain the current
level of supply. In other words, having access to agricultural
credit is crucial in order to seize opportunities arising from
trade liberalization.
In the following illustrative analysis, the agricultural sector
faces a beneficial exogenous-demand shock in the form of new
market opportunities. This shock is indirectly depicted in
Figure 1 as the derived producer-price increase. For reasons of
simplicity, the analysis ignores any effects of the domestic

Figure 1: Producer gains from trade liberalization and access to credit
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market; thus the analysis assumes that production for foreign
and domestic markets respectively are completely separated.
Figure 1 depicts a situation in which the agricultural sector
initially produces the quantity q 0 and producers receive the
price p 0 = p f / (1+t), where pf is the price in the foreign market, t is the applied tariff level, and p 0 is the price received on
exports to the foreign market. Following a trade liberalization,
such as a removal (or reduction) of tariffs, the producer price
on internationally traded agricultural commodities increases to
p1 = p f. In other words, farmers in general receive higher
export prices following trade liberalization.
Area A in Figure 1 represents direct producer gains from
trade liberalization as a consequence of the higher prices
received on exports. The trade liberalization enables an export
expansion, which in turn allows the production to increase.
Note that the analysis implicitly assumes that the exporting
country is small, because the demand curve is flat. Area B represents the indirect gains from a production expansion leading
to a trade expansion. This can be achieved only by investing in
production capacity when farmers are operating at or near the
capacity limit, which is assumed in the following. These potential gains from investment thereby imply an increased demand
for credit. 2 Area C represents additional potential externalities,
e.g., positive spill-overs that can be achieved by certain institutional setups, discussed later in more detail. The total gain (A
+ B + C) is divided among producers, consumers and trade
agents. 3 Only the gains of producers are considered in the following.
Area A represents the gains from receiving higher producer
prices on exports to the foreign market. With access to credit,
the farmer is able to invest in increased capacity and thus
extract the full immediate gain of liberalization, ∆A and ∆B.
These gains are unambiguously positive.
The benefits arising from externalities, which are depicted
as a shift of the supply curve in Figure 1 generating area C, are
specifically connected to social capital. Social capital can been
20
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defined in a multitude of ways, the most popular of which
refers to “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by
facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). In the
present context, the most prominent feature is social networks
that enable efficiency gains through resource-sharing.
These externalities may derive from learning spill-overs
associated with the credit-disbursement process, such as social
capital augmenting human capital. Such learning spill-overs
can arise when clients attend meetings at the credit institution
and interact while waiting, thereby improving their networks;
for example, learning spill-overs contribute to the social capital of farmers by enabling them to draw upon the human capital of one another. Enhanced social capital might lead to
improved knowledge or adoption of new methods creating a
productivity externality, which produces positive gains if and
only if the transaction costs are relatively small in comparison
to the productivity gains. Drawing on other forms of capital
through such social networks may create even more social capital and thus other positive externalities.
In summary, this model illustrates three effects—both
direct and indirect—of increased market access depicted in
Figure 1: ∆A, the immediate gain from producers receiving
higher prices on their exports; ∆B, the additional indirect gain
to be captured when farmers invest in an increased supply
capacity; and ∆C, a potential social-capital effect external to
the investment decision. These effects are discussed in the next
section.

Agricultural Credit in Central Europe
and Eastern Africa
The model described above illustrates the importance of wellfunctioning agricultural credit markets, but in transition countries, credit markets do not function well, and in some
developing countries, formal agricultural credit markets are
entirely missing.
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Agricultural Credit in Central Europe
Central Europe represents the transitional economies that are
front-runners for the EU enlargement. Agriculture under the
communist regimes was collectivized in most Central
European countries. Later, in the process of transition, most
collectivized farmland was restituted, although a substantial
part of this farmland has been leased back to the transformed
cooperative farms. Poland was an exception; it maintained private ownership of eighty percent of the land and farm assets,
thereby maintaining small and inefficient farms throughout
the communist period (European Commission, 1998). This
coexistence of relatively small private farms and large-scale
cooperative and state farms is typical of the dualistic character
of agriculture in all Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC).
The process of transition from centrally planned to market
economies, complemented by the removal of state subsidies,
led to lowered profitability. Furthermore, the process of transition made much of the existing agricultural capital and infrastructure unfit for the emerging agricultural structure,
necessitating additional investment in restructuring production. However, reformed credit institutions are often reluctant
to finance agricultural investments. This lack of investments
further lowers profitability thereby putting a “brake” on additional investments.
The lack of investment in agriculture is closely related to
the land market, which is not functioning well in the CEEC
(Swinnen et al., 2001). Since land prices are low (due to the
lowered profitability in agriculture), the demand for land is
limited, and thus banks are reluctant to accept land as a collateral (Lukas, 1999). In addition, some CEEC have introduced
measures that distort land markets. For example, Hungary,
like Russia, linked agricultural land purchase with the requirement of professional qualification and obligation of cultivation
(CIVITAS, 2001).
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As a response to these problems, Central European countries have launched various measures to tackle the lack of
credit. For example, the Czech Republic has employed the
State Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry—SGFFF (in
Czech: Podpurny a garancni rolnicky a lesnicky fond)—to provide collateral guarantees and interest-rate subsidies through
various programs. Other CEEC have applied similar measures.
These programs have successfully treated symptoms, but
neglected the main source of the problem: land cannot be used
as collateral, and as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
subsidies lead to credit-rationing problems. 4 These problems
must be solved in order to enable the much-needed
investments.

Agricultural credit in East Africa
The CEEC have relatively minor credit problems in comparison to the situation in developing countries. As Yaron &
Benjamin (1997, p. 40) document, the endemic failure of previous agricultural credit schemes in developing countries was
partly a consequence of “biased sectoral policies, excessive government intervention, and legal and regulatory barriers.” In
comparison to a number of other African countries, East
African semiformal rural financial markets are relatively developed, although they exemplify the problems typical of developing countries. East African financial markets are shallow, as
indicated by broad money (M2) being only twenty-five of
GDP—about half of the average for Central Europe—implying
that the general access to credit is restricted. 5 In addition, limited existing credit sources are usually allocated to urban purposes, which means that formal types of agricultural credit are
virtually nonexistent for at least three-fourths of the
population.
A number of high-profile microfinance organizations in
these countries provide both urban and rural financial services.
In addition, a few formal banks have entered the microfinancial markets, but East Africa is still far from having well-functioning agricultural credit markets. For example, only one
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semiformal organization in Uganda, FOCCAS, focuses
entirely on agricultural credit. In addition, the Centenary
Rural Development Bank (CRDB) serves the non-poor rural
population. Findings show that even microfinance schemes discriminate against farmers; for example 82 percent of the
Ugandan population works in agriculture, while only 46 of the
microfinance clients are farm-based, implying that even these
subsidized, high-profile microfinance schemes discriminate
against agriculture (Barnes et al., 1999). The average loan size
at the CRDB is 877 US$—about 80 percent of yearly GDP per
capita, indicating that the poor segment of the population,
which includes most farmers, is not served by the bank.
Moreover, nationwide, there is less than one bank branch per
120,000 inhabitants, implying that less than 20 percent of
microentrepreneurs, including the vast majority of farmers,
have access to credit (Jacobson, 1999).
In other East African countries, agricultural credit markets
are also thin. From a potential of 4 million Tanzanian informal
enterprises, of which a substantial part are based in agriculture,
semiformal credit institutions currently cover only about
40,000, or 1% of the prospective market (Hulme, 1999). The
coverage in Kenya is higher but unsatisfactory in relation to
the total demand, pointing to a large low-income agricultural
population without sufficient access to credit. This population
is excluded from the benefits of investing in farm production,
and, as the worldwide inventory by Paxton (1999) suggests,
low-income farmers in developing countries in general have
significant demands to be met. Currently, the effect of microfinance in Africa is limited, but the experiences from Southeast
Asia demonstrate its potential.

The Importance of Credit Markets
As the model illustrates, an agricultural sector receiving a positive exogenous demand shock, for example through an
increased market access provided for by various trade liberalizing agreements, will be able to react optimally, and thus benefit
24
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from the increased export opportunities, if efficient agricultural credit markets are in place. The model shows how the
effects leading to producer gains can be split into three components, which are treated separately below. Because the EU
market is important for both regions, it serves as an example of
the foreign market in the model (Ministry of Agriculture of
the Czech Republic, 2001).

Immediate Gains from Trade Liberalization
The EU enlargement and the Cotonou Agreement are examples of such potentially beneficial demand shocks. In the presence of ill-functioning credit markets, the good will of the
European Union’s trade agreements might not be exploited
optimally. The EU accession will allow Central Europe, as
well as the EU countries, to trade freely and thus benefit from
their comparative advantages, entailing an increased agricultural-export potential related to increases in producer prices.
For example, producer prices on Czech and Hungarian beef
exports, identified as important by O.E.C.D. (1995), will
increase by 20 to 25 percent. 6 Based on available data, a guesstimate of the ∆A gains (see Figure 1) in the beef sector are in the
vicinity of 600,000 US$ for the Czech Republic, and 4 to 5 million US$ for Hungary.
In the East African context, the “Everything but Arms”
initiative dramatically increases the access of Least Developed
Countries (LDC) to EU markets, thereby increasing the export
potentials of Uganda and Tanzania. The ∆A gains for the
Ugandan beef-production are in the vicinity of 100 000 US$,
following a fifty percent increase in producer prices. Similar to
the C.E.E.C. accession to the EU, extracting the full potential
of the E.B.A. initiative requires investments.
Gains from Investments
As shown in Figure 1, the potential investment effects, ∆B, can
only be captured by investing in production capacity or by
employing any excess capacity that farmers might possess at
present.7 Khandker & Faruqee (2001) provide a striking example
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of Pakistani agricultural credit markets. The study documents
the severe constraints in the Pakistani agricultural credit market. In 1985, only ten percent of rural households borrowed
from formal institutions, and a negligible share of the households borrowed from semiformal institutions. Nevertheless,
the study estimates that marginal returns to agricultural production are 69 percent Borrowing from the Agricultural
Development Bank of Pakistan hence translates into a six percent average marginal return to credit on agricultural income.
The results indicate that poor households benefit much more
than richer households.
A study sponsored by USAID estimates the impact of
Ugandan credit schemes, which demonstrate that the impact of
having access to credit can be significantly positive for lowincome clients, raising their income by as much as 50 percent
(Barnes et al., 1999). 8 Deininger & Olinto (2000) undertook a
similar quantitative study in Zambia. The conclusion of the
study suggests that apart from the quite substantial effects of
investing in production (livestock, fertilizer, etc.) comparable
to the study from Pakistan, there is an additional benefit of
having access to credit, corresponding to ∆C in the model.

Gains from externalities
The findings of Deininger & Olinto (2000) suggest that there
are significant externalities connected to credit access. All
other things being equal, these additional benefits work
“magic” on total factor productivity. The increased productivity is not explained by a standard economic investment framework and could perhaps be attributed to various psychological
and social effects. The “supervision” externality mentioned by
Deininger & Olinto (2000) can for example be attained
through an increased responsibility level and by signaling a
higher level of trustworthiness. Such signals and the knowledge of increased responsibility will be spread in communities
(the farmers’ social network) through a shared “social
language.”
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In other words, the externality probably works through
increasing social capital at the individual and the community
level, which is complementary to other forms of capital.

Figure 2. Externalities
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The beneficial effects of social capital can, for example, include
impacts of learning spill-overs (Kilpatrick & Falk, 1999),
increased capacity utilization—for example, from sharing
machinery—(Weijland, 1999), and improved common pool
resource management (Anderson et al., 2000).
Figure 2 shows these potential gains from social-capital
externalities, ∆C. The magnitude of these gains depends on the
design of credit institutions. In an entirely informal institutional framework (the act of borrowing from friends and family) credit depends on farmers’ social capital to the extent that
lenders must trust borrowers; in other words the social capital
relied upon consists of bonding social capital—trust in the network nucleus formed by families and close friends (Woolcock,
1999). Similarly, formal banks also seem to rely on and create
some social capital (Deininger & Olinto, 2000). However, this
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social capital is of a more institutional character, comprised
more of rules than norms. Because this capital is partially separated from clients’ networks, it should perhaps be denoted as
institutional capital.
The largest externalities probably arise in connection with
borrowing at semiformal institutions. These institutions,
depicted in the middle of the formality scale, usually rely on
forming groups with joint liability and responsibilities instead
of relying on formal rules. These groups receive access to
credit at the semiformal organization, which is thereafter disbursed among group members. Repayment thus depends on
trust and norms within the group, or in other words, the social
capital of the group (Bjørnskov, 2000).
In general, Grameen replications and village banks rely relatively more on social norms, whereas cooperative structures
rely more on formal rules. Both institutional structures rely on
and create bridging social capital, or trust and networks of
more distant friends and acquaintances. The externalities arising from semiformal institutions are therefore larger than in
either formal or informal institutions because they create relatively more social capital by expanding clients’ networks
(Larance, 1998).
The total magnitude of these externalities associated with
having social capital might be greater than the simple sum of
its various subcomponents, due to potential cross-effects
between single components that create a synergistic effect.
These effects lead to the additional producer gain depicted in
Figure 1 by area C. In other words the magnitude of these
externalities depends on the accumulation of social capital
attributable to farmers’ participation in the credit institutions.
As is evident in the mathematics of the model, it must not be
forgotten that even these positive benefits come with some
transaction costs, mainly the time spent outside productive
activity. Researchers have recently criticized many microfinance institutions for not being sufficiently aware of this problem. An awareness of the importance of minimizing
28
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transaction costs is often seen as the key to the success of Latin
American programs (Bhatt & Tang, 1998). Therefore, at the
end of the day it must be considered where best to invest farmers’ time.

Suggestions for Institutional Design
The simple model and research findings point to the need for
tailoring the institutional design to its social and economic
environment. In many countries, agricultural profitability is
lowered due to constraints in the agricultural credit market.
These constraints call for improving the agricultural credit
institutions. By providing low-income farmers with sufficient
credit, efficient investment decisions can be taken, thus
increasing agricultural capacity and profitability. If farmers
gain sufficient access to credit, there will be no use for state
interventions, and in particular not for distortionary interest
rate subsidies that work only as “pain killers.” 9 Under the current circumstances, the use of collateral subsidies may be necessary during a transition period, because they function as a
“bandage on a wound” while the proper institutions are being
set up.
To solve the credit issue in developing countries like East
Africa, the formation and use of microfinance institutions
should be encouraged, providing access to both savings and
credit facilities. The institutions do not need to be semiformal,
but can be a part of an already existing formal bank structure:
a top-down approach. However, the success of the Kenyan
Rural Enterprise Programme has shown that microfinance can
also evolve into formal bank structures, illustrating the feasibility of bottom-up development in the financial sectors
(Charitoneko et al, 1998).
As Bjørnskov (2000) points out, governments and international development institutions should probably subsidize the
education and training components of these institutions, but
must avoid direct subsidy of the actual financial component of
the institutions. The financial component should focus on
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achieving financial sustainability in the medium to long term,
while minimizing transaction costs for both borrowers and
lenders in order to function without destabilizing political
intervention. 10 Research suggests that social capital can be accumulated from participation in both components, leading to a
virtuous circle of economic benefits thereby furthering additional access to credit (Grootaert, 2001). In addition, governments should take any additional benefits to this social capital
into account when supporting the institutional design.
Apart from improving the access to credit, the institutional
design in developing countries should focus more on socialcapital externalities than in Central European countries, where
other institutional means for education and the distribution of
learning are in place. For most countries in Central Europe,
the transaction costs of standard microfinance solutions are
probably too high, taking the current agricultural structures
and history into account, but possible solutions that build on
the insights gained from microfinance could be used. 11 In particular, a positive feature to be borrowed from microfinance is
the use of the existing social structures, including the social
capital of rural communities. For example, if a group of five
farmers join together in order to purchase a shared investment
item, and aim at obtaining credit with joint liability, these
lessons show that their success will depend both on the selfselection of members of the group (the members must trust
each other) and the legal provisions for joint-liability lending
operations. Farmers joining resources for buying machinery,
for example a harvester, can use their social capital both for
obtaining the needed credit and for sharing the harvester, as
well as perhaps obtaining additional information and learning
from each other.
Summarizing in terms of the model, the access to credit as
such enables farmers to extract gains ∆B. An optimal institutional design also takes at least some of the externality gains,
∆C, into account. The issue is relatively more important to
East Africa than to Central Europe, where formal educational
30
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and institutional structures are fairly developed, but the importance of accounting for such effects is a lesson to be learned
from microfinance in both regions. Although access to credit
in itself holds the promise of reducing poverty, the model and
evidence suggest that the reduction efforts could be magnified
by accounting for beneficial social-capital externalities.

Conclusions
Agricultural sectors must be able to invest in necessary changes
of production structures and capacity in order to reap the gains
from increased international market access. For these investment purposes, farmers need to have access to credit.
Nevertheless, access to credit is a real bottleneck in both
Central Europe and East Africa, as well as in a range of other
countries. Formal banks in these countries are usually reluctant to lend to low-income farmers, often because farmers’
assets are not accepted as sufficient collateral because markets
for such assets are thin. In addition, enforcing collateral rights
in developing countries is often impossible.
In Central Europe, various state programs are addressing
the symptoms by subsidizing interest rates and providing collateral guarantees, rather than addressing the causes. Although
at first sight successful, this approach only postpones a real
solution of the collateral issue. In addition, the experiences of
several developing countries show that simply subsidizing
interest rates for agricultural credit can be both expensive and
dangerous.
Based on a simple model and empirical findings, this paper
argues that the cause of the problem can be alleviated by tapping into existing social structures, for example by relying on
joint liability to supplement the traditional collateral. In an
East African context, this can be achieved by encouraging the
provision of traditional microfinance. Some of the lessons
learned from microfinance, such as farmers’ ability to share
collateral and responsibility, can be applied in Central Europe.
Employing social capital often creates additional social and
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economic benefits external to the original investment
decisions.
The increased capacity and profitability in the agricultural
sector derived from improved financial institutions can
provide direct benefits to rural areas by improving low-income
farmers’ welfare. These benefits may imply that such lowincome farmers do not leave rural areas to seek alternative
employment opportunities in overcrowded urban areas, and
may thereby be supporting a move towards a more sustainable
rural and social development.
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1. The first wave of microfinance proved that interventions often had
adverse effects (see Yaron & Benjamin, 1997). During the last decade, Russia
introduced a similar approach with similar consequences (Wegren, 1998). In
some CEEC, highly subsidized agricultural credit schemes have not solved the
issue of access to credit either (Swinnen et al., 2001).
2. In real life situations, it must not be forgotten that as farmers gain access
to new markets, their comparative advantages could change, implying that the
optimal production structure will shift as well. This one-sector model captures
only one aspect of the problem, irrespective of other influences coming from
within or outside of the sector, necessitating further investments.
3. The share of the total gains accruing to the trading agents depends on their
relative bargaining strength. The remaining gain is divided between producers
and consumers, with the consumer share increasing and producer share decreasing with the degree of competition.

In order to make informed guesses about the size of the effects, the model
can be formulated in mathematical terms. The model uses a profit function proxying because welfare consists of a production function (Cobb-Douglas for simplicity), a price and a repayment term:
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where p = producer price, ϑ = a technology coefficient, K = composite capital, L = labor, H = human capital, r = interest rate, w = wages, and ω (initially = 1) is the social capital term. To be able to capture the full gains, farmers
borrow the amount M, which is repaid over two periods. This yields the effects
In the ∆C effect, social capital augments human capital, making ω>1, which
tends to make the effect positive. This is countered by the negative effect of the
transaction cost t associated with creating and maintaining social capital.
4. For example the Czech SGFFF has an impressive 96.5% repayment rate
(in interview with SGFFF, October 2001). However, the underlying problem of
farmers’ high indebtedness has not been addressed (Swinnen et al., 2001).
5. Averages for both regions conceal the fact that the Czech Republic and
Kenya have better-developed financial markets (data based on WDI, 2001).
6. Calculations are based on data from UNCTAD (2001) and TARIQ (2001).
7. For the lack of estimates on product specific supply elasticities, ∆B cannot
be calculated with any accuracy. However, relying on estimates of the supply
elasticity of total agricultural sectors, Central European supply responses, and
hence ∆B gains, in general will be approximately three to five times larger than
East African responses (communication with Hans G. Jensen, SJFI, October
2001).
8. The study is, however, methodologically flawed, not correcting for selfselection and a range of other client characteristics, as Bjørnskov (2000) pointed
out. Results should therefore be interpreted with some caution.
9. For example, the Malawi Mudzi Fund had a sufficient loan recovery for
some year, but due to one instant of failed harvest, repayment rates dropped dramatically. They did not recover the following years, and the Fund therefore collapsed, demonstrating that simply subsidizing ordinary credit disbursement can
be harmful (Hulme & Mosley, 1996).
10. Examples from Russia and Senegal emphasize the adverse link between
party politics and decision-making in credit programs (Wegren, 1998; Warning &
Sadoulet, 1998).
11. Contrary to small and medium sized enterprises, for which microfinance
solutions seem to be working in Central Europe (the Funduz Mikro in Poland,
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for example), relatively high transaction costs and the dismal experience of
forced agricultural cooperation in the communist period in general makes standard group-loan solutions not apt in all but the poorest parts of Central and
Eastern Europe.
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